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Abstract
In this paper, we explore graphical passwords as a child-friendly alternative for user
authentication. We evaluate the usability of three variants of the PassTiles graphical
password scheme for children, and explore the similarities and differences in perfor-
mance and preferences between children and adults while using these schemes. Children
were most successful at recalling passwords containing images of distinct objects. Both
children and adults prefer graphical passwords to their existing schemes, but password
memorization strategies differ considerably between the two groups. Based on our
findings, we provide recommendations for designing more child-friendly authentication
schemes.
Keywords: Children authentication, Graphical passwords, Usability evaluation
1. Introduction
Children constitute a significant portion of Internet users; 99% of Canadian children
aged 8 to 15 years are active online [1] and the statistics are similar in other countries [2].
Despite abundant authentication research, the literature on user authentication specif-
ically for children is relatively sparse. In fact, the main focus of online security for
children has been on designing methods for adults to protect their children [3, 4], or to
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educate children about the dangers of Internet usage [5].
Children do not necessarily have the same skills and preferences as adults, thus a
child-oriented authentication system that better suits children’s privacy and security
needs is long overdue. In this paper, we seek to address the gap by exploring the usability
of graphical passwords for children, and provide recommendations for developing
authentication mechanisms for children that are more adaptable to their needs. We
conducted two user studies with both children and adults in which they interacted with
three graphical variants of the PassTiles [6] password scheme: Objects, Image, and
Words PassTiles. We explore the similarities and differences in children’s and adults’
performance and perception. We found that both children and adults prefer graphical
passwords to their existing schemes. This paper has the following contributions.
1. Attempts to address the gap of child-oriented user authentication by exploring the
usability of graphical passwords for children.
2. Provides empirical results comparing children’s and adults’ performance and
preferences while using three different graphical password schemes.
3. Provides recommendations for adapting user authentication for children.
Organization. Section 2 presents a background on user authentication. Section 3
presents the original PassTiles graphical password scheme and our adaptation. We
present our user studies in Section 4, and the results in Section 5. The implications of
the results and general recommendations for children’s authentication are discussed in
Section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Authentication
The most commonly used authentication schemes are knowledge-based [7, 8, 9],
where the user memorizes a shared secret such as a password. Research has demon-
strated that text-based passwords suffer considerabily from both security and usability
issues [10, 9]. Bonneau et al. [9] developed a framework for evaluating alternative
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authentication schemes based on usability, deployability, and security benefits. They
found that no known scheme is ultimately better, suggesting that when choosing an
alternative to text passwords, one needs to balance the advantages and tradeoffs, and
choose the scheme that mostly fits one’s needs.
Despite abundant authentication research, the literature on user authentication specif-
ically for children is relatively sparse. We study graphical passwords [10] as an alter-
native authentication scheme for children. Psychology studies have acknowledged the
human brain’s superiority in recognizing and recalling visual information in contrast
to textual information [11, 10]. Graphical passwords, a form of knowledge-based au-
thentication, aim to utilize this human feature to reduce the user’s cognitive load of
memorizing passwords [12]. Graphical passwords can be categorized according to the
cognitive task necessary to remember the password: recognition, recall, and cued re-
call [13]. Recognition is the least cognitively burdensome, where a user needs to decide
whether the information presented to her matches what she had already memorized.
Recall, on the the other end of the difficulty spectrum, requires the user to remember the
information memorized without any clues. Cued recall offers some cues to trigger the
user’s stored memory [10, 12].
We focus our study on two recognition based graphical passwords (Objects and
Words PassTiles) and one cued recall graphical password (Image PassTiles) [6].
2.2. Children and Passwords
Recently researchers have taken interest in understanding how children perceive
passwords to develop security guidelines and recommendations for children. Lorenz et
al. [14] found that younger children were more receptive to security advice than
teenagers and adults. Studies by Read et al. [15] and Coggins [16] investigated chil-
dren’s knowledge of text passwords. Both studies found that children, without any
formal training, have at least some understanding of the purpose of passwords and how
to create strong ones. On the other hand, Zhang-Kennedy et. al. [17] found that adults
(parents and teachers) are primarily responsible for maintaining children’s online creden-
tials and the majority of children do not understand the reason why passwords should
remain secret. Coggins recommends integrating the concept of computer passwords
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in elementary school curriculum, to teach children early on best practices of computer
safety. He also suggests training children to memorize strings of random characters.
Read et al. [18] recommend using analogies when explaining security concepts to
children, e.g., keeping their game consoles safe in a drawer as an analogy to explain the
importance of keeping their passwords safe.
2.3. Authentication for Children
Two US patents have been filed for relevant authentication schemes. Each took
different approaches to authentication for children. Colella [4] proposed an authentica-
tion system that relies primarily on biometric identification. Using this authentication
system, a third party Application Service Provider (ASP) assigns each child a “Safe
Card” fingerprint scanner. The ASP maintains a database of approved websites for
each child. To login, the child connects her Safe Card to her computer, performs local
authentication on it, and the card in turn opens the ASP’s webpage and authenticates the
child to the ASP. The child can then access any of the pre-approved websites through the
ASP’s webpage. M. Renaud and Mulji’s [19] proposed “Little Bo Peep” scheme guides
users to create their own versions of familiar age-appropriate stories (e.g., fairy tales),
which are then used as their authentication tokens. They claim that the personalization
renders the stories more memorable than traditional authentication schemes.
On the adacemic side, K. Renaud [20] proposed an authentication system comprised
of user-drawn icon-sized images (Mikons [21]) with password space equivalent to
15.9 bits. Renaud suggests its use for low-risk systems used by children. It was tested
by children (11 and 12 years old) to access their online homework system. To sign
up, each student drew four Mikons to represent their password, then the class teacher
approved their choice of Mikons. To login, students choose their drawings from other
distractor Mikons. They were presented with four sets of challenges, each containing
15 distractors and one of their Mikons. Over the period of 8 months, students logged
into their homework system once every 2 months. Overall the system recorded an 87%
success rate. Mendori et al. [22] designed a password system for grade 1 Japanese
students, unfamiliar with the Roman alphabet and thus were unable to use traditional
text passwords. Mendori’s interface displays preset icons and symbols on a grid, and
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the child clicks on the ones that comprise their password. The researchers experimented
with three different configurations, all with password space equivalent to 11.9 bits,
however little has been published about the system’s usability.
3. PassTiles
PassTiles [6] is a graphical password system designed to facilitate the comparison of
different memory retrieval types by offering several configurable parameters. It presents
the user with a grid of tiles, and the password is composed of a subset of these tiles. The
passwords are system assigned and generated through the Multiple Versatile Passwords
(MVP) framework [23].
During the password memorization phase, the password tiles are visually highlighted
with a coloured border. PassTiles users practice entering their password by clicking on
the highlighted tiles in any order. When the user clicks a highlighted tile, the highlight
colour changes to indicate selection. A visual, and numeric, counter is decremented
with every click to show the number of tiles yet to be clicked. During login, the grid
appears without highlighting, but the counter is displayed. To login, users click on their
memorized tiles in no particular order.
We used three PassTiles schemes: Image, Objects, and Words. Each has 48 square
tiles in a 6×8 grid, and each password is composed of 5 tiles. Image PassTiles [6]
leverages cued recall by superimposing the tiles on a user-chosen background image,2
which users can use as a cue to recall the location of their password tiles. Objects [6],
and Words [24] PassTiles leverage recognition. Each tile in Objects PassTiles contains
an image of an object, and the password is composed of a set of these objects. With
each login, the tiles are shuffled, and users must rely on recognition to remember their
password objects, rather than recalling the tile positions. Words PassTiles is similar to
Objects, except it displays short simple words on the tiles.
For the purpose of our study, we simplified the original PassTiles interface by
removing non-essential features and simplifying the language to be better suited for
2The background image is user-chosen from a system-provided set.
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(a) Objects PassTiles (b) Image PassTiles (c) Words PassTiles
Figure 1: Adapted PassTiles interface during memorization phase with highlighted
password tiles. The orange highlight indicates the tile is yet to be clicked. A counter at
the bottom left indicates the remaining number of tiles to be clicked (3 in this example).
children. The existing image set on MVP was filtered and more age-appropriate images
were added. For Words PassTiles, the existing set of words was modified to shorter and
simpler ones. Figure 1 shows the three schemes during the memorization phase where 2
out of the 5 password tiles have been selected. The counter, at the bottom left of the
screen, also shows that 3 tiles remain. Figure 2 shows the three schemes during the
login phase. The interface does not highlight clicked tiles; in this example, the counter
indicates that user has clicked two tiles.
3.1. Security of PassTiles
Knowledge-based authentication systems must be resilient against two main types
of attacks: capture and guessing attacks [10]. Capture attacks involve acquiring the
actual password or part thereof (e.g., using keyloggers or observing password entry
through shoulder-surfing). A guessing attack is when the attacker tries to guess the
password. Depending on circumstances, an attacker may be able to exhaustively search
the theoretical password space (the total set of passwords an authentication scheme
allows), guaranteeing success, or may be limited in the number of guesses. Using
knowledge of password distributions, an attacker can prioritize higher probability
passwords (ones that users are more likely to use). Thus, to be resilient to guessing
attacks, authentication systems should have an appropriately large theoretical password
6
(a) Objects PassTiles (b) Image PassTiles (c) Words PassTiles
Figure 2: Adapted PassTiles interface during login, where clicked tiles are not high-
lighted, but the counter is decremented.
space and prevent predictable patterns in user-chosen passwords [10].
Recall, a PassTiles password is composed of 5 tiles on a grid of 6×8 tiles, and the
order of password entry is insignificant. The size of the theoretical password space for
PassTiles is log2
(
#rows×#columns
password length
)
= log2
(
6×8
5
)
= 21 bits. Floreˆncio et al. [25]
suggest that a password space of 20 bits is sufficient to protect against online guessing
attacks. To reduce the success of guessing attacks, PassTiles uses system-generated
passwords to utilize the full theoretical password space. In addition, system-assigned
passwords protect against targeted guessing attacks, as users do not choose personally
relevant elements. PassTiles does not highlight clicked tiles during password entry to
reduce the risk of shoulder-surfing attacks.
4. Methodology
We conducted two user studies, one with children and one with adults. The adult
study serves as our control condition. Our studies used a within subject design; each
participant tested all three schemes (Objects, Image, and Words). For both studies,
we used a balanced presentation order for the password schemes to minimize training
effects. Both studies were reviewed and cleared by our institution’s Research Ethics
Board.
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4.1. Procedure
Children Study. Each study session consisted of 5 phases, and lasted an average of
25 minutes. Each participant received a $10 gift card as compensation, even if they
withdrew from the study.
Phase 1: Introduction and Consent
Consent The participants’ parents signed a consent form agreeing to have their chil-
dren participate in the study and be audio-recorded. The Children subsequently
provided oral consent.
Introduction We explained to the participants the tasks they would be performing. We
showed them printed snapshots of the three password schemes and explained
verbally how the system worked and how they would enter their passwords once
they were memorized.
Phase 2: Memorization and First login
Phase 2 was repeated three times, once for each password scheme. Participants
completed Phase 2a followed by 2b for one scheme before moving to the next. They
were given the chance to login only once for each scheme.
Phase 2(a): Memorize Password
Participants memorized the system-assigned password presented on the screen.
Participants could practice entering their password as many times as they wanted.
Once the participant had memorized the password, she was asked to click the
start button.
Phase 2(b): First Login
On clicking the start button, participants were presented with the PassTiles in-
terface with no highlighted tiles. Participants clicked on the tiles they thought
composed their password, and the counter below the grid was incremented with
every click. Once they had made five clicks, a popup box informed them if it was
correct.
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Phase 3: Interview
We interviewed participants to gather some insight about their preferences and
perceptions of the three password schemes. The interview phase, which lasted for
approximately 12 minutes, also served as a distraction period between the first and
second login attempts (described in Phase 4). All interviews were audio recorded.
Phase 4: Second Login
To test memorability, participants were asked to perform a second attempt. The
three schemes were presented to each participant in the same order as in the first login
attempt, and each participant had only one attempt per scheme.
Adult Study. It followed the same procedure, with the following exceptions. The
consent form was signed by the participants themselves, each participant received $10
compensation in cash, and each session lasted an average of 18 minutes.
4.2. Environment and Equipment
The children sessions took place either at our research labs or at a public library.
Both offered a quiet, low-distraction environment. The adults sessions took place in our
lab.
We used a Sony VAIO laptop with a touch-screen running Windows 8. Participants
were instructed to use the mouse when interacting with PassTiles; however, three
children found the mouse too difficult to use and switched to using the touchscreen.
4.3. Participant Demographics
4.3.1. Children Study
We recruited 25 children between 7 and 12 years of age (mean = 9.5 years), ten boys
and fifteen girls. All children were accompanied by a parent. Twenty-four participants
had previously used at least one type of authentication on their tablets. Table 1 shows
the distribution of children’s experience with existing authentication schemes. Twenty
participants reported their parents taught them how to create passwords, two were taught
by their older siblings, and two were self-taught.
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Table 1: Distribution of authentication schemes children have used on their tablets.
Authentication scheme None PINs
Passwords
Pattern
alphanumeric letters only
Number of children 1 10 9 6 2
4.3.2. Adult Study
We recruited 25 adults for this study. Twenty participants were between 18 and 30
years of age and five were over 30. Fourteen participants were male and eleven female.
Five participants had a high school diploma, twelve had a Bachelor’s degree, six had
a Master’s degree and two had Doctoral degrees. All participants were familiar with
the use of passwords and had experience using multiple passwords for different online
accounts.
5. Results
We explored user performance through time and login success measures, and user
preferences through interview questions.
We conducted Shapiro-Wilk test to check the normality of children’s and adults’
memorization and login times (first and second attempt) for the three schemes. The
distribution of times significantly deviated from the normal distribution (p < 0.05), thus
for these variables, we use non-parametric statistical tests.
For the following statistical tests, unless otherwise stated, we conduct Friedman
tests to determine the differences between the three authentication schemes. In case of
significant difference, we follow up using Bonferroni-corrected Wilcoxon post hoc tests.
For these tests the calculated degrees of freedom is 2.
5.1. Memorization Time
We recorded the time spent memorizing each password, from the time the assigned
password appeared until the participant clicked the start button to perform the first
login attempt. Figure 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the time spent by children
and adults memorizing each scheme. Table 2 presents results of the statistical tests
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Figure 3: Memorization time for Objects , Image , and Words
comparing times per scheme for the children and adults separately. Average times per
scheme (in seconds) range from 29.5 to 32.6 for children and 20.1 to 33.5 for adults,
with several outliers.
We found no statistical difference between schemes in children’s memorization time.
However, there was a statistical difference for adults; the post hoc test indicated that
adults took significantly longer memorizing their Image password than the other two
schemes. Since memorization time is a reflection of how much effort participants chose
to devote to memorizing their password, we conclude that children did not perceive one
scheme to be harder to memorize than the other, while adults perceived Image to be
more difficult.
5.2. Login Times
The time spent entering each password was recorded, from the time participants
clicked the start button until they clicked 5 tiles. Figure 4 shows the descriptive statistics
for the time participants spent logging in using the three schemes. Table 2 presents
results of the statistical tests measuring the effect of scheme for the first and second
login attempts respectively, per study. Average login times (in seconds) range from 20.5
to 60.6 for children and 11.7 to 35.7 for adults, with much less variation for adults.
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(a) First attempt (b) Second attempt
Figure 4: Time (in second) to login by children and by adults using Objects , Image ,
and Words
5.2.1. First Attempt
On the first attempt, children were significantly faster logging in using Image
compared to the two other schemes. Children were also significantly faster logging in
using Objects compared to Words. Similarly, login times for adults’ first attempt were
significantly different for the three schemes. The post hoc test shows that the login time
for Words was significantly slower than that of Objects and Image. We conclude that on
the first login attempt, children found Image the easiest to recall, followed by Objects,
and both children and adults found Words the hardest scheme to recall.
5.2.2. Second Attempt
We found a statistical difference between children’s second login times; the post
hoc test shows that the login time for Words was statistically slower than that of Objects
and Image. Additionally, adults’ second attempt login times for Words was statistically
slower than Objects, which in turn was statistically slower than Image. We conclude
that, on second attempt, adults found Image the easiest to recall, followed by Objects,
and both children and adults found Words the hardest scheme to recall.
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Table 2: Results from Friedman test and Bonferroni-corrected Wilcoxon post hoc test
looking at differences between the three schemes in memorization and login times by
children and by adults.
Children Adults
Friedman test Post hoc Friedman test Post hoc
time X2 p O-I O-W I-W X2 p O-I O-W I-W
Memorization 1.354 .508 17.111 .000 .006 1.000 .000
1st login 30.081 .000 .007 .049 .000 22.566 .000 .537 .003 .000
2nd login 29.714 .000 .071 .006 .000 26.929 .000 .022 .040 .000
O: Objects, I: Image, and W: Words. Colour indicates statistically significant results
(a) First attempt (b) Second attempt
Figure 5: Successful login attempts by children and by adults using Objects , Image ,
and Words
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Table 3: Results from Cochran’s Q test and Bonferroni-corrected McNemar post hoc
test looking at difference in login success between the three schemes for children and
for adults. The calculated degrees of freedom is 2.
Children Adults
Cochran’s Q test Post hoc Cochran’s Q test Post hoc
login success X2 p O-I O-W I-W X2 p O-I O-W I-W
1st attempt 2 .368 4.133 .127
2nd attempt 2.909 .234 12.737 .002 .006 .006 1.000
O: Objects, I: Image, and W: Words. Colour indicates statistically significant results
5.3. Login Success
We recorded whether each login was a successful or a failed attempt. Figure 5 shows
the number of participants’ successful logins. To test if there is a significant effect of
scheme in each study, we use Cochran’s Q test. We follow up on statistically significant
results by conducting Bonferroni-corrected McNemar post hoc tests. The results of the
statistical tests is presented in Table 3.
5.3.1. First Attempt
On first attempt, we found no effect of scheme on login success for children or
adults.
5.3.2. Second Attempt
There was no effect of scheme on login success for children’s second attempt.
However, we found statistical difference between the three schemes for adults. Adults
were significantly more successful logging in using Objects than the other two schemes.
We built a logistic regression model to determine the effect of the length of memo-
rization time on the likelihood that participants successfully logged in on the second
attempt. However, the model was not significant, for neither children nor adults, thus
memorization time cannot be used as a predictor for the outcome of the login attempt.
5.4. Degree of correctness
Compared to previous literature, adults’ success rate is considerably lower. While
no comparison is available for children, they also struggled with login. This could
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have been influenced by our study design, stressing memory by having three passwords
memorized in a short time and allowing only one login attempt at a time. To explore
further the reasons for low login success, we examined partially correct responses. We
counted the number of correct tiles for each attempt. Figure 6 shows the descriptive
statistics for the number of correctly chosen tiles.
5.4.1. First Attempt
The median for each scheme is 4 or 5 correct tiles out of 5 on the first attempt, sug-
gesting that participants had reasonable success at remembering most of their password.
We found no effect of scheme on the degree of correctness for children, nor for adults.
5.4.2. Second Attempt
The degree of correctness for the second attempt showed more variability, particu-
larly for the children. A Friedman test on the degree of correctness of children’s second
login attempt shows a statistical difference between the schemes, however, the pairwise
comparison cannot identify with significant confidence which pairs differ. Looking
at the data (see Figure 6b), we suspect that with a larger sample size, Objects would
have the highest level of correctness while Image would be the worst. On the other
hand, the degree of correctness for adults’ second login attempt showed a statistical
difference, and the post hoc test confirmed that adults’ degree of correctness for Objects
was significantly higher than that of Image and Words. We conclude that on second
login attempt, adults found Objects the easiest to correctly recall, and children appear to
be following the same trend.
5.5. Interview Results
We explored participants’ perceptions and knowledge of online privacy and security,
and asked them specific questions about the three schemes they tested; we asked
participants:
• Which type of password did you like the most? [Preferred scheme]
• Which one was the most difficult? [Most Difficult scheme]
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(a) First login attempt (b) Second login attempt
Figure 6: Number of correct tiles selected on each login attempt using Objects , Image ,
and Words
Table 4: Results from Friedman test and Bonferroni-corrected Wilcoxon post hoc test
looking at differences between the three schemes in the number of correct tiles chosen
by children and by adults.
Children Adults
Friedman test Post hoc Friedman test Post hoc
correctness X2 p O-I O-W I-W X2 p O-I O-W I-W
1st attempt 3.077 .215 4.978 .083
2nd attempt 6.200 .045 .198 .231 1.000 14.94 .001 .014 .022 1.000
O: Objects, I: Image, and W: Words
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• Which of the passwords do you think is the safest? [Safest scheme]
For each question, we tabulated the number of participants that identified a scheme
in their response. Figure 7 summarizes participants’ responses. The Safest scheme
question has only 24 responses; one child could not identify the safest scheme. We
conducted One-Way Chi Square tests to determine whether a scheme stood out as the
most preferred, the most difficult, the safest, by comparing to expected even distributions
of 8.5 responses per scheme.
5.5.1. Preferred Scheme
We did not find statistical evidence of one scheme being more preferred by children,
nor by adults. Looking at the distributions in Figure 7, we see very similar patterns
between children and adults; Objects was the preferred scheme for 48% of the children
and 44% of adults, followed by Words then Image. A larger sample would be needed to
confirm this trend.
5.5.2. Most Difficult Scheme
We found no statistical evidence of one scheme being perceived by children as the
most difficult. However, adults perceived Objects to be the least difficult (X2(2,N =
25) = 7.760, p < 0.05). This coincides with it being preferred by more adults compared
to Objects and Image.
5.5.3. Safest Scheme
We asked the participants which password scheme they thought was the safest and
the most difficult to guess or hack. Figure 7 shows a very similar pattern between
children and adults, in terms of their perceived safety of the schemes, and no significant
effect of scheme was found.
5.5.4. Understanding of Security
We found that compared to children, adults have a much better understanding of
online privacy and security, and they reported well-known security advice, such as, not
sharing passwords with others, frequently changing passwords, and avoiding logging in
17
(a) Children (b) Adults
Figure 7: Interview Results showing the number of participants choosing Objects ,
Image , and Words
to untrusted websites. On the other hand, only a small number of children reported any
advice. Among those who did, they explained that they should not share their passwords
with anyone and should not give their personal information to strangers, they should
have strong passwords stored in a safe place, and they should not click on ads or give
their email addresses to strangers. The majority of children rely on their parents for
managing their passwords; they either share their passwords with their parents, or they
ask their parents to reset their passwords for them if they have trouble remembering
them. Only six children manage their passwords on their own, and they reported writing
them down. We found, contrary to previous research [15, 16], that the majority of
children are fairly unaware of security practices and may be particularly vulnerable to
attacks.
5.5.5. Observations
While using the adapted PassTiles interface, three children found it difficult to
use the mouse and opted to use the touchscreen for inputting their passwords. All in
all, children did not show any signs of confusion using the interface and were able to
perform the tasks without major problems. The adults similarly did not encounter any
significant hurdles.
However, we observed that both children and adults made the mistake of clicking
the same tile twice during login, without noticing the number-of-clicks counter. This
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happened by either double-clicking a tile (rather than a single click) or by forgetting the
tile was clicked, and clicking it again. Clicked tiles are not highlighted during the login
phase to help protect users from shoulder surfing attacks.
Additionally, the two youngest participants (7 years old) had trouble pronouncing
the Words password, making it difficult for them to identify their tiles. On the other
hand, several adult participants and the older child participants tried to memorize the
Words and Objects password by forming a sentence with the words, or the objects’
names.
Finally, we observed that children overlooked the pop-up message notifying them
whether their login attempt was successful. This feedback, which was intended to help
with the formation of a correct mental model of the system, was noticed by almost all
adult participants but ignored by the majority of the children.
6. Discussion
The majority of children learned about passwords from their parents or older siblings.
However, advice they receive from adults is not necessarily ideal; adults struggle with
passwords and they do not always follow security best practices, which even applies to
security experts [26] and system administrators [27]. Moreover, coping strategies that
adults use are not necessarily applicable or useful for children. For example, to easily
memorize the Words password, some of the adults formed a sentence with the words
appearing on the highlighted tiles. However, we observed that children were struggling
with this scheme; they took the longest logging in using Words and they had much
trouble memorizing their Words password. Therefore, when designing authentication
systems for children, we especially need to think about their skills, cognitive abilities,
and preferences, since these can have significant impact on children’s ability to use the
system.
We found that, when choosing an image for Image PassTiles, most adults chose
an image they thought would be most helpful in remembering—having a variety of
content in different locations. On the other hand, children selected images they found
to be interesting, usually containing animals or toys, and ignoring whether it would be
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easy to remember when divided into tiles. Cued recall works best with unique cues
on the background image, and since children are inattentive to this fact, it is important
that the pool of images for ImagePassTiles should have enough distinct features to
help with memorability. In addition, if we allow users to upload their own images,
as suggested by some of the children participating in our study, these images should
undergo a prescreening process to make sure they are feature-rich.
During the memorization phase, adults generally did not practice entering their
passwords as often as children did; they spent the time observing the password carefully.
Perhaps because adults are more familiar with the process of learning passwords than
children, they may have been better able to draw on these past experiences to come up
with successful memorization strategies. Adults perceived Image PassTiles to be harder
to memorize, and so they spent significantly more time memorizing it than the other
two schemes. On the other hand, children took their time to memorize their passwords
and practiced them several times before logging in. Despite practicing, they had trouble
remembering their passwords; we may need to offer additional support to guide their
efforts. For instance, it might be possible to extend password memorization through
gamification to achieve better success.
Overall, the login success rates were much lower than would be necessary for a real
world deployment, which could be due to the structure of our study. The scenario was
more difficult than would be in a real life situation, e.g., users do not normally have to
memorize three different passwords in a very short time frame. Thus, in the real world,
we would expect the login success rates to increase. However, we can see this is an
especially hard task for children. Based on our experiences and observations, we make
the following recommendations for children’s authentication.
R1. Facilitate memorization through learning and training features
We recommend incorporating learning/training features to facilitate memorization
within the password creation process. Due to children’s inattentiveness to system
notifications, and because interactive training features might prove to be more successful
for children [28], we would recommend a more attractive method of notification that
includes positive feedback from the system as encouragement. We would also like to
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encourage the creation of stories during the memorization process of both Objects and
Words PassTiles by linking together the password’s words or objects and incorporating
this strategy into the user interface.
R2. Adapt interface to be age-appropriate for children
We observed age-related differences in how children memorized their passwords
and interacted with the interface. As with earlier research [29], our work indicates that
we need different computer interfaces for children throughout the stages of development.
For example, for younger children, we could use colourful words from age appropriate
curriculum or from popular storybooks in Words PassTiles, and familiar objects such
as animals and toys in Objects PassTiles. To help with their interaction with graphical
passwords, we recommend using touchscreen input instead of mouse input as children
tend to accidentally drag and double-click [29] with the mouse which could lead to false
input. Additionally, it might be useful, for children as well as adults, to refrain from
counting duplicate clicks on the same tile towards the total count of inputed password
tiles.
Although participants had less than desirable login success rates, looking more
closely we see that most participants had nearly correct entries. This may indicate
that shorter passwords might be more manageable for children (albeit at a decrease
in security). Alternatively, a system which accepts entries as correct if they meet a
certain threshold may also be conceivable, which aligns with Chatterjee et al.’s [30]
typo-tolerant password authentication framework.
R3. Combine schemes to improve memorability
We were surprised that adults found Words PassTiles to be the most difficult scheme.
We had assumed that because adults have a bigger vocabulary and are more experienced
with words, they would find Words PassTiles more favourable. Although children
generally had difficulty, the ones who formed stories with the words in their passwords
remembered them better. We recommend using words with pictures to provide additional
cues that could help with memorization. This could also be beneficial in circumstances
where a user does not recognize the object illustrated.
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7. Conclusion
Despite the abundance of work looking at authentication mechanisms, the litera-
ture addressing children’s authentication is relatively sparse. We explored graphical
passwords as an alternative authentication method for children through two user studies—
one with children and another with adults. Both children and adults preferred graphical
passwords to their existing authentication scheme. Of the three schemes, children were
most successful with Objects PassTiles, although they had some difficulty completely
recalling any of their passwords. We explored similarities and differences in preferences
and performance between children and adults. For example, we found that children are
less careful when memorizing their passwords than adults and memorization strategies
that adults use are not always applicable for children. Thus, it is necessary to consider
children’s cognitive abilities and skills to design child-friendly authentication systems.
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